Commanding board of director attention: Investigating how organizational performance and CEO duality affect board members\u27 attention to monitoring by Tuggle, Chris S. et al.
University of Nebraska - Lincoln
DigitalCommons@University of Nebraska - Lincoln
Management Department Faculty Publications Management Department
2010
Commanding board of director attention:
Investigating how organizational performance and
CEO duality affect board members' attention to
monitoring
Chris S. Tuggle
University of Nebraska-Lincoln, ctuggle2@unl.edu
David G. Sirmon
University of Washington - Seattle Campus, dsirmon@uw.edu
Chris R. Reutzel
Utah State University, christopher.reutzel@usu.edu
Leonard Bierman
Texas A & M University - College Station, lbierman@mays.tamu.edu
Follow this and additional works at: http://digitalcommons.unl.edu/managementfacpub
Part of the Strategic Management Policy Commons
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Management Department at DigitalCommons@University of Nebraska - Lincoln. It has
been accepted for inclusion in Management Department Faculty Publications by an authorized administrator of DigitalCommons@University of
Nebraska - Lincoln.
Tuggle, Chris S.; Sirmon, David G.; Reutzel, Chris R.; and Bierman, Leonard, "Commanding board of director attention: Investigating
how organizational performance and CEO duality affect board members' attention to monitoring" (2010). Management Department
Faculty Publications. 117.
http://digitalcommons.unl.edu/managementfacpub/117
Introduction 
The role of boards of directors in corporate gov-
ernance represents a broadly studied topic (Daily, 
Dalton, and Cannella, 2003a; Finkelstein, Ham-
brick, and Cannella, 2009). The primary theoreti-
cal lens used to investigate boards of directors has 
been agency theory (Dalton et al., 2007). Agency 
theory argues that by monitoring, corporate board 
members can observe and control senior manag-
ers’ interests such that they do not diverge sub-
stantially from those of owners (Dalton et al., 2007), 
thereby mitigating, at least partially, various costs 
associated with the separation of ownership and 
control (Fama, 1980; Fama and Jensen, 1983b). For 
this reason, monitoring  management, especially 
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Abstract
Boards of directors’ attention to monitoring represents an understudied topic in corporate governance. By ana-
lyzing hundreds of board meeting transcripts, we find that board members do not maintain constant levels of at-
tention toward monitoring, but instead selectively allocate attention to their monitoring function. Drawing from 
the attention-based view, prospect theory, and the literature on power, we find that deviation from prior perfor-
mance and CEO duality affect this allocation. Specifically, while negative deviation from prior performance increases 
boards’ attention to monitoring, positive deviation from prior performance reduces it. The presence of duality also 
reduces the boards’ allocation of attention to monitoring. Additional analysis demonstrates that the effects of dual-
ity are realized in part by the CEO-chair’s control of the meeting’s agenda and location. Finally, the results show that 
duality and deviation from prior performance interactively affect boards’ attention to monitoring. In total, we find 
that board members do not consistently monitor management in order to protect shareholder value, a proposition 
often assumed within governance research; rather, our results demonstrate that board members’ monitoring be-
haviors are contextually dependent. The contextual dependency of board attention to monitoring suggests that ad-
ditional efforts may be needed to ensure the protection of shareholders’ interests.  
Keywords: board of directors, monitoring, CEO duality, attention-based view, prospect theory, power
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top executives, represents a highly important task 
for board members. 
Because of its importance, the monitoring role 
of boards has been the focus of extensive corporate 
governance research (e.g., Hermalin, 2005; Johnson, 
Daily, and Ellstrand, 1996; Monks and Minow, 2004). 
Within this stream of work, the influence of a board’s 
composition (e.g., independence of board members) 
and structure (e.g., duality) on its monitoring role has 
been of great interest (Dalton et al., 2007; Finkelstein 
and Hambrick, 1996; Johnson et al., 1996). In fact, 
many empirical studies utilize board composition 
and structure variables as proxies for board monitor-
ing (Kroll, Walters, and Wright, 2008). However, we 
argue there is more to understanding the monitoring 
function of boards than merely observing their com-
position and structure. 
We assert that, like all social actors, board members 
face significant limitations in their information pro-
cessing and calculation capabilities (Cyert and March, 
1992; Simon, 1947). These limitations force board 
members to selectively attend to certain issues and 
thereby forgo others (Ocasio, 1997). In other words, 
board members’ attention, “the noticing, encoding, in-
terpreting, and focusing of time and effort” on a par-
ticular issue or issues (Ocasio, 1997: 189), is limited. 
Therefore, even though monitoring management is a 
highly important task, we expect the allocation of at-
tention to monitoring—that is, “the noticing, encod-
ing, interpreting, and focusing of time and effort” 
on the act of monitoring—to vary (Hillman, Nichol-
son, and Shropshire, 2008). But, because “much of 
agency theory is closer in spirit to an unbounded ra-
tionality tradition than to limited rationality” (Cyert 
and March, 1992: 222; Williamson, 1988), most prior 
board studies assume that directors allocate attention 
to monitoring consistently. However, this assumption 
lacks both theoretical and empirical support, which 
might explain the inconclusive results of studies that 
have attempted to link monitoring with firm-level 
outcomes (Dalton et al., 1998, 2007). We take a differ-
ent approach, endeavoring to identify what factors af-
fect boards’ allocation of attention to monitoring and 
how these factors increase or decrease that allocation. 
To theoretically ground our investigation of board 
members’ allocation of attention to monitoring, we 
draw upon the attention-based view (ABV) (Ocasio, 
1997). At its core, the ABV argues “that what decision 
makers do depends on where they focus their atten-
tion” (Barnett, 2008: 606). Moreover, the ABV argues 
that decision makers’ allocation of attention is in turn 
influenced by 1) contextual factors and 2) the struc-
ture of the decision makers’ interaction. Accordingly, 
the ABV suggests that board members’ attention to 
monitoring represents an important antecedent to 
actual monitoring, yet the allocation of attention to 
monitoring is expected to vary based on contextual 
and structural factors. Because the theoretical mech-
anisms within the ABV have been “expressed at a rel-
atively general level” (Cho and Hambrick, 2006: 453), 
related empirical research often focuses on factors of 
specific importance to the identified decision mak-
ers: for example, top management teams (e.g., Bou-
quet and Birkinshaw, 2008; Cho and Hambrick, 2006; 
Kaplan, 2008; Yadav, Prabhu, and Chandy, 2007; Yu, 
Engleman, and Van de Ven, 2005). With respect to di-
rectors’ allocation of attention to monitoring, ABV 
logic helps identify firm performance and duality as 
especially relevant factors. First, as a contextual fac-
tor, firm performance is relevant given its use by di-
rectors as a means to assess managerial effectiveness 
(Walsh and Seward, 1990). More specifically, we sug-
gest that deviation from prior performance helps 
quantify managerial effectiveness and thus influences 
board members’ allocation of attention to monitor-
ing. Second, CEO duality represents a fundamental 
element in the structural arrangement of a board that 
can affect board members’ interaction (Finkelstein 
and D’Aveni, 1994; Finkelstein et al., 2009). Thus, du-
ality is also expected to influence board members’ al-
location of attention to monitoring. 
Next, to improve our understanding of how these 
factors increase or decrease the allocation of attention 
to monitoring, we draw upon prospect theory (Kahn-
eman and Tversky, 1979; Tversky and Kahneman, 
1981, 1992) and the literature on power (Lukes, 1974; 
Pfeffer, 1981, 1992). These perspectives complement 
our use of ABV by identifying how deviation from 
prior performance and duality, both directly and in-
teractively, affect boards’ allocation of attention to 
monitoring. 
This study makes multiple theoretically and em-
pirically important contributions to the literature. 
First, we bring a novel theoretical perspective to re-
search on corporate governance by extending the 
ABV to the realm of corporate boards. In contrast to 
prior research, which relies on an assumption of ra-
tionality and coarse-grained proxies of monitoring 
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(Baliga, Moyer, and Rao, 1996;  Boyd, 1995; Brick-
ley, Coles, and Jarrell, 1997), we instead address and 
measure boards’ allocation of attention to monitoring 
with much more fine-grained proxies and with an as-
sumption of bounded rationality. To test our model, 
we analyze hundreds of detailed transcripts of actual 
board meetings. This provides a missing large-sam-
ple, yet fine-grained, view of internal board meeting 
processes, allowing us to enhance our theoretical un-
derstanding of board monitoring by responding to 
Pettigrew’s (1992) call to move beyond what boards 
look like and study what boards actually do. Indeed, 
our results show that instead of maintaining a con-
stant allocation of attention to monitoring, board 
members vary their allocation of attention to monitor-
ing based on deviations from prior firm performance 
and the presence or absence of CEO duality. Thus, in-
vestigating boards’ allocation of attention to monitor-
ing offers a new avenue to understand the extent to 
which boards address their monitoring function. 
Second, by incorporating insights from prospect 
theory, we turn around what has been a frustrating 
search for a monitoring-performance link (Dalton et 
al., 2007) and find support for our theoretical discus-
sion of how performance influences a board’s atten-
tion to monitoring. Third and relatedly, by showing, 
theoretically and empirically, how duality affects a 
board’s allocation of attention to monitoring (as op-
posed to its being a proxy of monitoring), we increase 
our understanding of how duality matters. Instead of 
treating CEO duality as a proximal antecedent of firm 
performance, as is often the case, we find that it pro-
vides power to influence the board’s allocation of at-
tention to monitoring. Our work thus suggests that 
if duality has any influence on performance, it will 
likely be indirect (Daily et al., 2003a). 
This paper begins by noting agency theory’s con-
tributions and limitations in addressing the board 
monitoring function.We then provide a more elab-
orate discussion of the important factors that affect 
board members’ allocation of attention to monitor-
ing based on ABV logic. Next we draw upon prospect 
theory and the literature on power to develop our hy-
potheses. Following this, we present the details of our 
methodological approach, with particular emphasis 
on the empirical treatment of the board meeting tran-
scripts. Finally, we close with a discussion of the re-
sults and implications for theory and practice. 
Theoretical framework and hypotheses 
Agency theory represents the primary theoretical 
framework employed to examine the monitoring role 
of corporate boards (Dalton et al., 2007). Agency the-
ory posits that as a result of the separation between 
ownership and control, managers’ interests poten-
tially conflict with those of stockholders (Fama, 1980; 
Fama and Jensen, 1983b). Specifically, agency the-
ory suggests that top managers may choose to pur-
sue strategies and activities that benefit themselves 
at the expense of stockholders (Eisenhardt, 1989; Jen-
sen and Meckling, 1976). Accordingly, agency the-
orists view the monitoring of managements’ actions 
as a primary role of boards of directors, one that pro-
tects shareholders’ interests (Dalton et al., 2007; Hill-
man and Dalziel, 2003). 
However, empirical research from an agency per-
spective is equivocal with respect to the issue of board 
monitoring. For example, Wright, Kroll, and Elenkov 
(2002) conclude that board monitoring is affected by 
outside directors. Specifically, they found post-acqui-
sition CEO compensation changes were based on per-
formance criteria when the board was composed of 
more outside directors, while post-acquisition CEO 
compensation changes were based on size (changes 
in total assets) when the board was composed of 
fewer outside directors. Likewise, other research has 
found equity ownership of outside directors to be 
linked to greater levels of monitoring (Hambrick and 
Jackson, 2000). However, neither Dalton et al.’s (1998) 
meta-analysis nor Dalton et al.’s (2007) literature re-
view revealed support for this relationship or agency 
prescriptions in general. Thus, while some have con-
cluded, and policy has followed the assumption,1 that 
‘more independent outside directors, blockholder 
board membership, and board member ownership 
indicate that directors are vigilant as monitors’ (Kroll 
et al., 2008: 364), more work appears to be needed to 
understand what factors influence board monitoring 
and how those factors operate.  
1. This belief is evidenced in the passage of regulations in many countries (e.g., Sarbanes-Oxley Act, New York Stock Exchange, 
and NASDAQ requirements in the United States; Cadbury and Hampel report requirements in the United Kingdom; and the 
Toronto Stock Exchange requirements in Canada) that mandate outside directors on boards. See Dahya and McConnell (2005) 
for an outline of 18 different countries that have instituted such corporate governance regimes.   
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Certainly, monitoring requires monitors to engage 
in such behavior. However, agency theory “gives 
a much smaller weight to limited rationality, as op-
posed to conflict” (Cyert and March, 1992: 221). Thus, 
agency-based prescriptions such as increased outside 
directors, blockholders, and board member owner-
ship assume, at least implicitly, that board members 
are capable of attending fully to all matters, including 
monitoring. From an ABV, however, such assump-
tions are inaccurate (Ocasio, 1997; Simon, 1947). In 
fact, outside of agency theory, several streams of re-
search concerned with governance, such as those tak-
ing a social psychological and strategic leadership 
perspective, do not assume board member rational-
ity (e.g., Finkelstein et al., 2009; Westphal, 1998; West-
phal and Fredrickson, 2001). For example, a series of 
studies by Westphal and colleagues demonstrate how 
social processes such as ingratiatory behavior, social 
distancing, and director experiences influence board 
monitoring behaviors (e.g., Westphal, 1998; Westphal 
and Fredrickson, 2001; Westphal and Khanna, 2003; 
Westphal and Zajac, 1997). These studies underscore 
the importance of how context affects the selective fo-
cus of director attention. 
Building on Simon’s (1947) ideas, Ocasio (1997) 
puts forth three principles supporting the ABV. The 
first is focused attention, or the notion that decision 
makers attend to issues based on the focus of their 
attention. The second is situated attention, or the idea 
that the focus of an actor’s attention is affected by 
contextual factors. The third is structural distribution 
of attention, or the idea that controls (e.g., rules, for-
mal committee structure, agenda for meetings, etc.), 
used inclusively, affect the focus of an actor’s atten-
tion. Thus, paramount to the ABV is the notion that 
actors selectively allocate attention (which facilitates 
perception and deliberation) toward some objects or 
ideas, and away from others. Selective allocation of 
attention is necessary because decision makers can-
not effectively attend to all possible stimuli, but in-
stead must choose among competing targets. More-
over, selective allocation of attention is important 
because it influences the actions in which decision 
makers eventually engage. Therefore, understanding 
the contextual and structural factors that influence an 
actor’s selective allocation of attention can help in un-
derstanding the actor’s behavior. 
A variety of issues may compete for board mem-
ber attention. Perhaps most importantly to corpo-
rate functioning, board members must choose how 
much attention to allocate to their multiple board re-
sponsibilities. Within their roles as directors, they of-
ten must allocate their attention to various functions 
such as resource provision, environmental scanning, 
opportunity seeking, and monitoring (Hillman and 
Dalziel, 2003; Johnson et al., 1996; Zahra and Pearce, 
1989). However, because monitoring top manage-
ment may represent the most fundamental function 
of board members (Fama and Jensen, 1983b; Jensen 
and Meckling, 1976; Zald, 1969), we limit our investi-
gation to understanding factors that influence the al-
location of board attention to monitoring (Dalton et 
al., 2007; Finkelstein et al., 2009). This focus may be 
particularly valuable because the ABV suggests that 
monitoring first requires that boards allocate atten-
tion to this important function.2 
Identifying factors salient to board members’ allo-
cation of attention to monitoring can be facilitated by 
considering the principles of situated attention and 
structural distribution of attention, both developed 
by Ocasio (1997). First, using the principle of situated 
attention, we identified firm performance as a contex-
tual factor highly important to board members. More 
specifically, deviation from prior performance gives 
the board a contextual factor to assess management 
against shareholder concerns and is thus expected to 
be especially relevant to board members’ allocation 
of attention to monitoring (Fama and Jensen, 1983b; 
Zald, 1969). Second, based on the principle of struc-
tural distribution of attention, Ocasio (1997: 195) ar-
gues that any factor that influences “the agenda for 
the meeting” or “the formal structure of the commit-
tee” is likely to be very important. Thus, the formal 
structure of the board is expected to affect the allo-
cation of attention. Specifically, the presence of CEO 
duality, as an element of the board”s formal struc-
ture, is especially relevant to board members’ al-
location of attention to monitoring. In sum, apply-
ing ABV logic to boards of directors suggests that to 
make better sense of board monitoring, the context 
2. While increased allocations of attention to monitoring are likely to increase the actual behavior of monitoring, they do not 
guarantee any level of quality. Therefore, we argue that attention is essential but not necessarily sufficient for monitoring 
effectiveness.  
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and structure of the board need to be considered, and 
that deviation from prior performance and duality 
are especially important factors in determining the al-
location of attention to monitoring.
Next we develop the theoretical logic of our hy-
potheses. Building on the insights that the ABV of-
fers, we first draw upon prospect theory to explain 
how deviation from prior performance affects direc-
tors’ allocation of attention to monitoring. Then we 
draw on the power literature to facilitate our inves-
tigation of how duality affects the allocation of at-
tention to monitoring. Finally, we investigate the in-
teractive relationship between deviation from prior 
performance and duality. 
Performance and attention to monitoring 
Breaking away from assumptions of rational, util-
ity maximizing decision making, Kahneman and 
Tversky’s prospect theory (i.e., Kahneman and Tver-
sky, 1979; Tversky and Kahneman, 1981, 1992) de-
scribes how problem framing affects behavior. Pros-
pect theory suggests that preferences for risky 
behavior change depending on how alternatives 
compare to a point of reference (Shimizu, 2007). This 
perspective is similar to that proposed by behavioral 
decision theory (Greve, 2003; Wiseman and Gomez-
Mejia, 1998). In fact, prior work has noted the marked 
similarity between the two theories (Audia and 
Greve, 2006; Shimizu, 2007). Summarizing insights 
from these theories, Audia and Greve (2006) state 
that decision makers 1) focus on deviation from a ref-
erence level of performance, 2) code this deviation as 
failure when current performance is below the refer-
ence and success when above, and 3) are more mo-
tivated to overcome failure than to continue success. 
While prospect theory is used primarily to address 
actors’ risk preferences, Greve (2003: 696) suggests 
that growing empirical results show that “perfor-
mance relative to aspiration level functions as a “mas-
ter switch” that affects a wide range of organizational 
behaviors.” For example, performance deviation has 
been shown to affect outcomes ranging from CEO 
advice-seeking behavior (McDonald and Westphal, 
2003) to resource management actions (Morrow et al., 
2007; Sirmon, Gove, and Hitt, 2008; Sirmon, Hitt, and 
Ireland, 2007; Sirmon, Hitt, Arregle, and Campbell, in 
press). We suggest that, as a “master switch,” devia-
tion from prior performance will affect the boards’ al-
location of attention to monitoring top managers. 
Deviation from prior performance may be espe-
cially salient to the board for at least two reasons. As 
discussed previously, the board has a fiduciary re-
sponsibility to shareholders to monitor and assess the 
performance of management (Zald, 1969). Boards of-
ten use firm performance as a proxy for management 
effectiveness because of the complexity and ambi-
guity surrounding the managerial task (Walsh and 
Seward, 1990). Moreover, firm performance is a very 
high priority for most shareholders. 
Second, firm performance has reputational con-
sequences for board members (Fama, 1980). While 
the reputations of members serving on the boards 
of high-performing firms may be enhanced, the con-
verse is also true. In fact, negative reputational costs 
may be a greater concern for board members. Re-
search shows that significant negative reputation 
costs accrue to board members of poorly performing 
firms, especially if financial restatement is necessary 
(Srinivasan and Richardson, 2005). Consequently, 
board members’ motivation to monitor management 
is based partially on self-interested protection of their 
reputations and potential future earnings (Fama and 
Jensen, 1983a). 
We posit that together, director fiduciary respon-
sibility and reputational effects will affect the atten-
tion boards allocate to monitoring management. 
Prospect theory suggests that the “win” framing that 
positive deviation from prior performance consti-
tutes will lead boards to conclude that management 
is acting in the best interest of shareholders and di-
rectors, and that positive deviation is therefore likely 
to prompt board members to allocate less attention 
to monitoring management. For example, the Rocke-
feller family, which still owns as much as one percent 
of the ExxonMobil Corporation (Krauss, 2008; Muf-
son, 2008), recently charged that the firm”s unusually 
strong current performance has led that company’s 
board to become “myopic” and engage in relatively 
little monitoring of company management (Clark, 
2008). Conversely, prospect theory suggests that 
“loss” framing of negative deviation from prior per-
formance will lead boards to allocate more attention 
toward monitoring management to prevent finan-
cial losses for shareholders and reputational costs for 
themselves. Therefore, we hypothesize the following: 
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Hypothesis 1a: Negative deviation from prior 
performance will increase the board’s allocation 
of attention to monitoring. 
Hypothesis 1b: Positive deviation from prior 
performance will decrease the board’s allocation 
of attention to monitoring. 
By drawing upon the ABV to highlight board 
members’ limited information processing capabil-
ities, we have suggested that boards do not allocate 
equal amounts of attention to every issue (Cho and 
Hambrick, 2006; Cyert and March, 1992); rather, they 
allocate attention based on the importance of the is-
sue they face (Ocasio, 1997). Prospect theory suggests 
that decision makers are often more motivated to take 
assertive behavior to prevent loss than to achieve ad-
ditional gains. Combining these insights, we suggest 
that changes in the allocation of attention to monitor-
ing will differ across the range of performance devia-
tion. Specifically, we suggest that the effects of prior 
performance deviation on boards’ allocation of at-
tention to monitoring, instead of being equal, will be 
greater in the context of negative rather than positive 
deviation from prior performance. 
Hypothesis 2: The effect of negative deviation 
from prior performance on the board’s allocation 
of attention to monitoring is greater than the ef-
fect of positive deviation. 
Duality and attention to monitoring 
Other considerations besides contextual factors af-
fect board members’ allocation of attention. Struc-
tural factors, such as CEO duality, also play an im-
portant role. Combining arguments derived from the 
power literature with ABV, we suggest that CEO du-
ality is relevant because it may allow the CEO to limit 
board members’ allocation of attention to monitoring. 
CEO duality refers to instances in which the same 
person holds the titles of CEO and chairperson of 
the board of directors in a corporation (Baliga et al., 
1996; Rechner and Dalton, 1989). CEO duality is of-
ten viewed as an impediment to the board’s monitor-
ing of top executives (Baliga et al., 1996; Finkelstein 
and D’Aveni, 1994) and can serve to entrench a CEO 
within an organization by compromising a board’s 
ability to monitor and discipline management (Mal-
lette and Fowler, 1992). 
Corporate CEOs, with or without duality, gener-
ally have incentives to direct board attention away 
from monitoring. As Walsh and Seward succinctly 
note: 
Top managers are well aware of their pre-
carious employment situations. Consistent 
with the evidence in the turnover literature, 
they know that they are at risk of being dis-
missed for suboptimal organizational perfor-
mance, even if they did not contribute to the 
problem. Valuing their position, many exec-
utives work to ensure their own job security. 
Toward that end, they have no choice but to 
tamper with the board’s ability to monitor 
and control their performance (Walsh and 
Seward, 1990: 430–431). 
In view of the extra power that duality affords a 
CEO (Cannella and Lubatkin, 1993), it is reasonable 
to expect CEO-chairs to divert the board from moni-
toring top management. 
Prior research shows that duality affects CEO com-
pensation (Conyon and Peck, 1998), earnings man-
agement (Davidson et al., 2004), CEO succession 
(Cannella and Lubatkin, 1993; Goyal and Park, 2002), 
and stock market performance (Coles, McWilliams, 
and Sen, 2001; Dalton et al., 1998). Moreover, prior re-
search suggests that CEO duality empowers the CEO 
and weakens the board of directors (e.g., Cannella 
and Lubatkin, 1993; Finkelstein and D’Aveni, 1994). 
Particularly salient to this study is the notion that 
CEO duality affords CEOs the wherewithal to en-
trench themselves within their respective firms. Spe-
cifically, the power associated with CEO-chairs may 
enable them to create norms in which it is inappro-
priate to question management’s effectiveness (Mace, 
1971). Such circumstances likely reduce the board’s 
proclivity to monitor management, resulting in less 
board attention to monitoring. For instance, in 2008, 
Rockefeller family members charged that the current 
CEO duality structure at ExxonMobil has hampered 
the ability of the company’s board to ask “tough 
questions” (Krauss, 2008: C6). In sum, we argue that 
duality will negatively affect the board’s allocation of 
attention to monitoring. Formally:  
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Hypothesis 3: CEO duality will negatively affect 
the board’s allocation of attention to monitoring. 
Duality, performance, and attention to monitoring 
Hillman and colleagues (2003; 2008) note that mon-
itoring top management requires both ability and 
motivation on the part of board members. However, 
as argued above, duality may enable the CEO to af-
fect the board’s ability to monitor, while performance 
deviation affects the board’s motivation to monitor. 
Thus, the effects of deviation from prior performance 
on the board’s allocation of attention to monitoring 
are expected to change in the presence of duality. 
Poor firm performance is often a key contextual 
factor boards of directors consider in cases of CEO 
dismissal. However, research on CEO dismissal sug-
gests that duality weakens the relationship between 
poor firm performance and the likelihood of CEO dis-
missal (Fredrickson, Hambrick, and Baumrin, 1988). 
Thus, duality tilts the balance of power in favor of the 
CEO such that even as firm performance deteriorates, 
board monitoring can be impeded. As Finkelstein 
and Hambrick note, “when the balance of power fa-
vors boards, they will be more vigilant in monitoring 
and disciplining top management; when CEOs are 
more powerful, boards will be ineffective monitors” 
(Finkelstein and Hambrick, 1996: 223). As the devi-
ation from prior performance becomes increasingly 
negative, CEO-chairs may be more inclined to exer-
cise their influence over their board’s monitoring ef-
forts in order to protect their jobs (Walsh and Seward, 
1990). 
On the other hand, in the context of positive de-
viation from prior performance, where board atten-
tion to monitoring is already decreasing, the power 
that duality affords the CEO is expected to amplify 
this relationship. For example, in May 2008, Exxon-
Mobil CEO and Chairman Rex Tillerson, in the con-
text of the company’s unusually strong recent perfor-
mance, orchestrated a clear defeat of a campaign by 
the Rockefeller family to eliminate CEO duality at the 
company (Gold and Eaton, 2008; Mufson, 2008). In 
sum, we hypothesize the following: 
Hypothesis 4a: CEO duality moderates the rela-
tionship between negative deviation from prior 
performance and the board’s allocation of atten-
tion to monitoring such that duality weakens the 
relationship. 
Hypothesis 4b: CEO duality moderates the rela-
tionship between positive deviation from prior 
performance and the board’s allocation of atten-
tion to monitoring such that duality amplifies 
the relationship. 
Methods 
Sample 
Our initial sampling frame for this study consists 
of the publicly traded firms in 18 industries. Publicly 
traded firms were used because Securities and Ex-
change Commission (SEC) reporting makes infor-
mation on board of director characteristics publicly 
available and because the required board meeting 
transcripts are commonly of higher quality for firms 
accountable to the SEC. However, these board meeting 
transcripts are not publicly available. Thus, we needed 
to obtain firms’ participation in order to analyze their 
board transcripts. (For details regarding how the sam-
ple for this study was obtained, see Appendix A.) 
In total, 178 publicly traded firms’ board tran-
scripts were analyzed for this study. We analyzed 
these transcripts for the years 1994 through 2000. 
However, events such as mergers, delisting, failure to 
file with SEC, and bankruptcy resulted in some of the 
firms not having complete data over this time period. 
Thus, an unbalanced panel dataset consisting of 979 
firm-year observations represents our final sample. 
We tested for sample-inclusion bias by comparing 
the characteristics of the firms that “opted into” this 
study and firms that did not, using the Kolmogorov-
Smirnov two-sample test. This tests whether two dis-
tributions differ and whether it is reasonable to as-
sume the samples come from the same population. 
Across all the archival variables in the study, the re-
sults showed no statistically significant difference be-
tween the “opted-in” and “opted-out” firms. 
Dependent variable 
To measure the amount of attention boards pay 
to their monitoring role, we used a form of content, 
or text, analysis. Content analysis is based on  the 
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assumption, consistent with the Sapir-Whorf hy-
pothesis, that word choice reflects the “cognitive 
categories” individuals use to allocate their atten-
tion (Cho and Hambrick, 2006; Sapir, 1944; Whorf, 
1956). “Words that are frequently used are cogni-
tively central and reflect what is most on the user’s 
mind; words that are used infrequently or not at all 
are at the cognitive peripheral, perhaps even repre-
senting uncomfortable or alien concepts” (Cho and 
Hambrick, 2006: 459; Huff, 1990; Tuggle, Schnatterly, 
and Johnson, 2010). Researchers have used such anal-
ysis in numerous organizational studies, often ex-
amining publicly available firm documents such as 
letters to shareholders or annual reports (e.g., Abra-
hamson and Park, 1994; Bowman, 1984; Clapham and 
Schwenk, 1991). Prior empirical studies have sup-
ported the usefulness of analyzing organizational 
communications (e.g., letters to shareholders) to in-
vestigate phenomena such as competitive aggres-
siveness (Chen and Hambrick, 1995; Chen and Mac-
millan, 1992; Chen and Miller, 1994), total number of 
actions (Young, Smith, and Grimm, 1996), and strate-
gic change (Cho and Hambrick, 2006). 
Because letters to shareholders, as well as many 
other forms of public communications, are carefully 
scripted documents, attempts to analyze their mean-
ing should proceed cautiously (Yadav et al., 2007). 
Nevertheless, prior studies have found the content 
of these letters are related to firm actions (Barr, 1998; 
D’Aveni and Macmillan, 1990; Yadav et al., 2007). In 
contrast to the scripted nature of letters to sharehold-
ers, board meeting transcripts are not carefully con-
structed or selectively edited by management. Rather, 
they simply account for board meeting discussions. 
To explore the boards’ allocation of attention to 
their monitoring role, we developed a list of words 
and phrases consistent with behaviors related to the 
monitoring function. We relied on the management, 
finance, and legal literatures encompassing concepts 
such as monitoring, control,3 agency of directors, and 
corporate governance to guide the development of 
the initial “indicator” word/phrase list.4 Next, the-
sauruses helped identify major synonyms of these in-
dicator words. Employing an iterative process during 
pilot coding of nonsample minutes, we added and 
deleted words until the impact of any further addi-
tion or deletion was considered to be minimal. The fi-
nal word and phrase list contains words and phrases, 
focus questions, and guiding definitions of monitor-
ing-related behaviors.  
The actual coding process was designed as a three-
stage procedure built on prior studies that have uti-
lized words (e.g., Cho and Hambrick, 2006) or sen-
tences (e.g., D’Aveni and Macmillan, 1990; Yadav et 
al., 2007) as the focal unit of analysis. After the indi-
cator word and phrase list was finalized, and the con-
cluding coding pretest was conducted, coders began 
coding the sample transcripts. For their first task, cod-
ers identified the indicator words and phrases within 
the board discussion text. Next, they identified the 
applicability or supporting nature (to our study) of 
the sentences surrounding these words and phrases. 
Finally, coders measured the duration in minutes that 
each board spent discussing monitoring topics re-
lated to its firm. 
As noted above, before coders examined the sam-
ple firm’s board transcripts, they trained with non-
sample firm transcripts. Initial interrater reliability 
scores were 0.78 (Krippendorff’s alpha).5 After addi-
tional discussions and further training, coders inves-
tigated a second pretest transcript on which interrater 
reliability improved to 0.89.6 
Following the logic in several content analy-
sis studies that suggests greater discussion implies 
greater attention (Sonpar and Golden-Biddle, 2008), 
we operationalize board of director allocation of at-
tention to monitoring as the time spent discussing 
monitoring-related issues over the total meeting time 
for all meetings in a year. Also, both the numerator 
and denominator were coded as minutes spent. We 
use percentage of yearly meeting time as our unit of 
analysis based on the premise that discussion of mon-
3.Words related to “control” were coded as well because it is often referred to as a substitute for (Zajac and Westphal, 1994) and/or a complement 
to (Milgrom and Roberts, 1992) monitoring. 
4. The complete list of words is available from the authors. Examples of monitoring and control “indicator” words and phrases include “executive 
compensation,” “firm performance (evaluation),” and “hiring of top management.”   
5. Like Cohen’s kappa, Krippendorff’s alpha is a reliability coefficient developed to measure intercoder agreement. However, Krippendorff’s 
alpha accommodates multiple coders (more than two) and interval/ratio-level data. See Krippendorff (2004) for further explanation of this 
measure. 
6. Upon completion of the coding by the second or, when applicable, the third coder, all the coders for a specific set of transcripts met to resolve 
the coding differences. After completing this discussion of coding discrepancies, there was a 98.3 percent rate of agreement among coders.  
954 Tu g g l e ,  S i r m o n ,  R e u t z e l ,  a n d  B i e r m a n  i n  St rat eg i c  M a n ag e m e n t  J o u r n a l  3 1  ( 2 0 1 0 ) 
itoring (when considered as a percentage of a whole) 
excludes or minimizes discussion of other topics. (For 
more detailed explanation of the protocols we de-
signed to increase the reliability of our dependent 
variable, please refer to Appendix B.)
Independent variables 
Duality is defined as a CEO’s also being the chair-
person of the board. Following prior research, a 
dummy variable was used to code duality (dual-
ity=1). These data, along with several control vari-
ables discussed below (i.e., director tenure, director 
age, outsider ownership, outside director percentage, 
board size, insider ownership, and institutional own-
ership) were collected through publicly available cor-
porate filings. 
Deviation from prior performance is hypothesized to 
affect board member behavior. We followed prospect 
theory in constructing this variable. Prospect theory 
argues performance relative to an aspiration level af-
fects behavior. Specifically, Audia et al. (2006) sug-
gest aspiration levels typically represent recent per-
formance. Thus, deviation from prior performance is 
current performance compared with the average of 
the prior two years’ performance. We measured firm 
performance with both return on equity (ROE) and 
return on assets (ROA), but these variables were an-
alyzed in separate models. These data were collected 
from COMPUSTAT. 
Control variables 
We use nine control variables in the analysis. The 
literature on group size suggests that larger groups 
are difficult to manage (Gladstein, 1984) and com-
plicate information processing (Haleblian and Fin-
kelstein, 1993). The effect of board size on board par-
ticipation in prior research is mixed. Some scholars 
suggest that board participation is negatively associ-
ated with board size on topical depth but positively 
associated with board size on topical breadth (Fin-
kelstein and Hambrick, 1996). Judge and Zeithaml 
(1992) find that the size of a board and board involve-
ment are negatively related. Zahra, Neubaum, and 
Huse (2000) found a curvilinear relationship between 
board size and corporate entrepreneurship that was 
initially positive but became negative when the num-
ber of directors reached 11 in their sample of me-
dium-size companies. Accordingly, we control for 
board size with the firm’s number of directors. 
Next, we control for a board’s relative power using 
two variables: 1) board relative tenure and 2) outside 
director equity ownership. Relative board tenure was 
operationalized as the average of directors’ board 
tenure divided by CEO tenure. Outside director owner-
ship percentage was operationalized as the number of 
shares owned by outsiders divided by the total num-
ber of outstanding shares. 
Additionally, we control for board independence, 
defined in terms of firm insiders and outsiders. We 
classified board members as insiders if they were em-
ployed by the firm or had very strong ties to the firm 
or its executive officers. Specifically, we coded direc-
tors as “insider,” “affiliated—family or former em-
ployee,” “affiliated— professional relationship with 
firm,” or “outsider.” Thus, we operationalized board 
independence by calculating each board’s outside di-
rector percentage. Also, because a board member’s age 
might be an indicator of his or her likely openness to 
new ideas about board independence and directors’ 
monitoring role, we control for average director age in 
all models (Zajac and Westphal, 1996). 
We also control for insider ownership percentage 
because a high level of insider equity holdings sug-
gests a natural alignment of shareholder and man-
agement interests and consequently less need for 
monitoring. Insider ownership percentage was opera-
tionalized as the number of shares owned by insiders 
divided by the total number of outstanding shares. 
Also, prior research has found that institutional 
investors apply considerable pressure to boards to 
monitor top managers (Hoskisson et al., 2002; West-
phal and Zajac, 1998). Therefore, we control for in-
stitutional ownership percentage with the total num-
ber of shares held by pension funds, banks and trust 
companies, savings and loans, mutual fund manag-
ers, and labor union funds divided by total common 
stock. Next, because evidence suggests firm size may 
affect board decision making (Finkelstein and Ham-
brick, 1996), we control for firm size with the natural 
log of annual gross sales. These data were obtained 
from COMPUSTAT. 
Lastly, we control for another reference point the 
board may utilize in evaluating management: in-
dustry performance. Specifically, we control for the 
firm’s deviation from industry performance  by using the 
average firm performance within its primary indus-
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try, based on three-digit Standard Industrial Classi-
fication (SIC) codes. This is important because per-
formance relative to industry affects how boards 
evaluate CEOs as well as CEO turnover (Gibbons and 
Murphy, 1990; Morck, Shleifer, and Vishny, 1989). 
We operationalized deviation from industry perfor-
mance as the difference between the industry’s aver-
age performance and the firm’s performance, divided 
by the industry average performance. This procedure 
was conducted for both ROE and ROA. 
Analytical approach 
We employed a fixed-effects panel methodology 
to analyze the data. A Hausman test yielded a sta-
tistically significant result, which suggests that the 
use of fixed effects was more appropriate than a ran-
dom-effects specification for these data. Addition-
ally, a fixed-effects application minimizes problems 
with autocorrelation and heteroskedasticity (Bowen 
and Wiersema, 1999; Hitt, Gimeno, and Hoskisson, 
1998; Sayrs, 1989), while controlling for unobserved 
firm- and year-specific heterogeneity (Greene, 2002). 
Accordingly, the timeinvariant effects, such as indus-
try membership, are addressed via the fixed-effects 
procedure. 
Additionally, to accurately test our hypotheses, 
we utilize spline functions in our models. Spline 
functions are useful in testing theories that suggest 
a continuous relationship will change slopes at crit-
ical thresholds (Greene, 2002; Marsh and Corm-
ier, 2002). Spline functions help depict differences in 
a construct of interest above and below the thresh-
old level (Greve, 1998, 2003; Sirmon and Hitt, 2009). 
In our study, we examine outcomes when perfor-
mance deviates above and below the average of the 
past two years’ performance. Instead of splitting the 
sample and modeling various subsamples individu-
ally, which would disrupt the continuity of the func-
tion, spline functions allow continuous relationships 
to meet and change slopes at theoretically deter-
mined threshold points, called “knots” (Greene, 2002; 
Marsh and Cormier, 2002). In our study, the knot is 
theoretically determined to be the status quo (Au-
dia and Greve, 2006). More specifically, a spline func-
tion splits a single continuous variable into two sepa-
rate variables, allowing one to model the relationship 
“above the knot,” while the other models the relation-
ship “below the knot.” In this study, deviations from 
prior performance are separated into negative devia-
tion and positive deviation. Importantly, we created a 
lag structure in our dataset. Specifically, all indepen-
dent and control variables were measured in period 
t, while the dependent variable was lagged one year. 
Results 
Table 1 provides descriptive statistics and bivariate 
correlations among the variables. All variables used 
to construct interaction terms were centered prior to 
calculating interaction terms. To test for the presence 
of multicolinearity, we followed procedures outlined 
by Neter, Wasserman, and Kutner (1985). The larg-
est variance inflation factor was 2.42, well below the 
commonly accepted threshold of 10, which indicates 
multicolinearity is not an issue. 
Table 2 presents the results of our analyses. Mod-
els 1a and 1b in Table 2 include only the control vari-
ables. As seen in both Model 1a and 1b, average di-
rector age and insider ownership percentage are 
negatively and significantly related to boards’ atten-
tion to monitoring. Thus, increased age and insider 
ownership reduce a board’s attention to the moni-
toring of management. Additionally, institutional 
ownership and outside directors have positive and 
significant coefficients. This suggests that higher in-
stitutional ownership percentage increases boards’ 
attention to monitoring. Likewise, independence in-
creases boards’ attention to monitoring management. 
The other control variables show no statistically sig-
nificant effect on a board’s attention to monitoring. 
Models 2a–4b progressively display the results of 
the hypotheses tests. Hypotheses 1a and 1b propose 
a positive relationship between negative deviation 
from prior performance and board attention to mon-
itoring, and a negative relationship between posi-
tive deviation from prior performance and board at-
tention to monitoring, respectively. The accurate 
interpretation of the coefficient for negative devia-
tion requires careful interpretation. When dealing 
exclusively with negative numbers, such as those 
represented by negative deviation from prior per-
formance, a negative sign on the coefficient indicates 
that greater deviation leads to higher levels of atten-
tion to monitoring. Thus, a statistically significant 
negative coefficient is required to support Hypothesis 
1a. As seen in Models 3a and 3b, negative deviation 
from prior performance is negative and statistically 
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significant. These results are also demonstrated in 
Models 2a, 2b, 4a and 4b. Thus, Hypothesis 1a is 
supported. 
Whereas negative deviation from prior perfor-
mance requires careful interpretation, positive devia-
tion from prior performance is more straightforward. 
Support for Hypothesis 1b requires the sign of the co-
efficient to follow the hypothesized direction, which 
in this case is negative. As seen in Models 3a and 3b, 
positive deviation from prior performance is negative 
and significant in both models. Again, these results 
are robustly demonstrated in the Models 2a, 2b, 4a, 
and 4b. Thus Hypothesis 1b is supported. Graphs de-
picting the results for Hypotheses 1a and 1b are pro-
vided in Figures 1 and 2. 
Hypothesis 2 predicts that the effect of negative 
deviation from prior performance on the board’s at-
tention to monitoring is greater than the effect of pos-
itive deviation. Tests of differences between the two 
coefficients show that they are statistically different 
and that negative deviation has a greater effect (for 
Model 2a: F = 90.45, p < 0.000; Model 2b: F = 85.05, 
p < 0.000). Likewise, Greve’s (2003) approach offers 
support. Specifically, Models 2a and 2b reveal the co-
efficients of positive deviation are between zero and 
their respective coefficient estimates for negative de-
viation. Thus Hypothesis 2 is supported. Hypothe-
sis 3 posits that CEO duality is negatively related to 
board attention to monitoring. As seen in Models 3a 
and 3b, CEO duality is negative and statistically sig-
nificant in both models. Finally, these results are also 
robustly demonstrated in Models 2a, 2b, 4a, and 4b. 
Thus, Hypothesis 3 is supported. 
Models 4a and 4b in Table 2 report the tests of Hy-
potheses 4a and 4b. Hypothesis 4a predicts that du-
ality will moderate the relationship between negative 
deviation from prior performance and board atten-
tion to monitoring such that the presence of CEO du-
ality will weaken the relationship. Thus, a positive 
sign for this interaction term is required to support 
this hypothesis. As seen in Models 4a and 4b, the in-
teraction term is positive and statistically significant. 
Thus Hypothesis 4a is supported. 
Hypothesis 4b posits that CEO duality moder-
ates the relationship between positive deviation from 
prior performance and board attention to monitor-
ing such that duality amplifies the relationship. Sup-
port of this hypothesis requires a negative interaction 
term. While insignificant for the ROA model, the in-
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teraction term in the ROE model was negative and 
statistically significant. Thus, Hypothesis 4b is par-
tially supported.7      
As briefly mentioned above, it is worthwhile to 
note that the primary first-order (noninteraction) 
variables of interest in the study remain substantively 
unchanged in Models 4a and 4b as compared with 
Models 2–3b. However, when interaction terms are 
present in a model, the first-order variable’s coeffi-
cients indicate conditional effects, as opposed to gen-
eral or main effects (Jaccard, Turrisi, and Wan, 1990). 
That is, they demonstrate the effect of the primary 
variable on the outcome of interest when the product 
term is zero (a condition created when the moderat-
ing variable equals zero). Aiken and West (1991) sug-
gest graphs based on simple slopes are the preferred 
means of depicting the results of regression models 
that include interaction terms. Graphs depicting the 
results from Models 4a and 4b are presented as Fig-
ures 3 and 4. Both figures show the effect of duality 
on the relationship between deviation from prior per-
formance and attention to monitoring. Most striking 
is that duality reduces the overall level of attention to 
monitoring (i.e., an intercept effect). Next, duality re-
duces the strength of the relationship between nega-
tive deviation and monitoring (i.e., a slope effect). On 
the other hand, only Figure 3 shows the effect of du-
ality on the relationship between positive deviation 
Figure 1. Effects of negative and positive deviation from 
prior performance (ROE)    
Figure 2. Effects of negative and positive deviation from 
prior performance (ROA)    
Figure 3. Interactive effects of deviations from prior perfor-
mance and duality (ROE)  
Figure 4. Interactive effects of deviations from prior perfor-
mance and duality (ROA)   
7. Results are robust when measuring prior performance relative to a firm’s prior three-year average and relative to a firm’s prior 
year.    
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from prior  performance and monitoring. In the pres-
ence of duality, the negative relationship between 
positive deviation and monitoring is stronger (i.e., a 
slope effect). Interestingly, this figure also shows that 
without duality, monitoring increases with positive 
deviation from prior performance. 
Discussion 
Researchers from a variety of academic fields have 
sought to better understand corporate governance. 
We add to this research stream by investigating ante-
cedents of boards’ attention to their central function: 
monitoring (Hillman and Dalziel, 2003). Understand-
ing how boards allocate their attention is important 
because, as the ABV argues, attention precedes ac-
tions (Ocasio, 1997). Thus, if monitoring behavior is 
desired, board members’ attention must first be allo-
cated to monitoring. However, unlike board research 
based on an agency perspective, which assumes, if 
implicitly, that board members are rational (Cyert 
and March, 1992), we argue that, like other decision 
makers (e.g., top managers), board members possess 
significant limitations in information processing (Oc-
asio, 1997; Simon, 1947). As such, board members do 
not attend equally to all matters, even issues that may 
merit such attention, but instead selectively allocate 
attention to issues deemed important (Ocasio, 1997). 
According to the ABV, selective attention allocation 
is determined by contextual and structural factors rel-
evant to the actors. Thus, we argued that deviation 
from prior performance (contextual factor) and dual-
ity (structural factor) are especially relevant in board 
members’ allocation of attention to monitoring. Our 
results support our theoretical logic and provide sev-
eral contributions to theory and practice. 
Perhaps most importantly, we found that, in-
deed, boards’ allocation of attention to monitoring 
varies.8 The results of all the hypotheses tests, based 
on data obtained by analyzing hundreds of detailed 
transcripts of actual board meetings, make this find-
ing quite robust. In sum, this means that boards do 
not maintain constant levels of attention to monitor-
ing, but instead attend selectively to their monitor-
ing function among other functions, based on contex-
tual and structural factors. Importantly, these results 
were obtained in models where independence and 
other indicators of board vigilance, along with other 
contextual factors, were included. Thus, attention to 
monitoring is based on more than demographic or 
composition variables—it involves the engagement of 
board members (Hillman et al., 2008). 
Beyond supporting the ABV’s basic tenets within 
boards, our findings also demonstrate prospect the-
ory’s applicability to corporate boards. In support 
of prospect theory, where deviation from prior per-
formance was identified as a key contextual factor 
to monitoring behavior, we found that negative de-
viation from prior performance leads to higher al-
location of attention to monitoring, whereas posi-
tive deviation leads to lower allocations of attention 
to monitoring. Moreover, the effects of negative and 
positive deviation were not equal: negative deviation 
had a greater effect on changes in the attention paid 
to monitoring than did positive deviation. 
These findings suggest that positive performance 
may lead to a weakness in corporate governance, at 
least as far as boards are concerned. Because many 
large-scale projects and proposals that boards evaluate 
are long-term in nature, if these plans are presented 
and discussed by the board when performance is in-
creasing, they may not be scrutinized at levels needed 
to fully understand their potential long-term effects on 
shareholder wealth. That is, when performance is in-
creasing and monitoring decreases, management may 
be able to divert boards’ attention and concerns more 
easily—a proposition the Rockefeller family has re-
cently raised in the context of the ExxonMobil Corpo-
ration. Similarly, this outcome might shed light on the 
crises faced by Citigroup (Editorial, 2008), Ford, AIG, 
and other companies caught in the recent global finan-
cial tsunami (Lublin, 2008). Of course, increased direc-
tor monitoring in times of performance declines may 
be too late owing to time compression and related dis-
economies (Dierickx and Cool, 1989). 
This study also extends research on board struc-
ture by considering the impact of CEO duality on 
8. It’s important to note that prior agency-based research finds that various control mechanisms may substitute or comple-
ment one another (i.e., Finkelstein and D’Aveni, 1994; Morck et al., 1989; Rediker and Seth, 1995; Sundaramurthy, 1996; 
Sundaramurthy, Mahoney, and Mahoney, 1997). More specifically related to this study, Beatty and Zajac (1994), Rediker 
and Seth (1995), and Rutherford, Buchholtz, and Brown (2007) find that boards often utilize managerial incentives as a 
means to mitigate agency concerns. These incentives (e.g., compensation, stock ownership, etc.) may serve as a, most likely 
partial, substitute for board monitoring.  
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boards’ allocation of attention to monitoring. We 
draw on the power and politics literature to argue 
that duality reduces board members’ allocation of 
attention to monitoring. In support, we found that 
duality leads to lower allocations of attention to 
monitoring. This suggests that the reason the liter-
ature lacks findings for a monitoring-performance 
relationship (Dalton et al., 2007) may be that the re-
lationship is more sophisticated than generally as-
sumed (Daily, Dalton, and Rajagopalan, 2003b). For 
instance, we see that performance affects monitor-
ing, which may in turn affect future performance 
via the boards’ influence on CEO turnover, resource 
provision, influence on strategy, and others. Such 
intervening factors offer promising directions for fu-
ture research. In total, this finding provides the ba-
sis for investigating more elaborate relationships be-
tween duality and firm performance. 
Continuing our investigation of deviation from 
prior performance and duality, we considered the 
interactive effects of these two variables on the 
boards’ allocation of attention to monitoring. In 
three of four tests, our results show lationship be-
tween the deviation from prior perfor that duality 
moderates the remance and attention to monitor-
ing. Specifically, we see that duality weakens the re-
lationship between negative deviation from prior 
performance and the boards’ attention to monitor-
ing. This finding suggests that when faced with the 
threat of poor performance, CEO-chairs utilize their 
power to combat the natural tendency of boards to 
increase attention to monitoring. 
The results are less clear regarding duality’s mod-
eration of the relationship between positive deviation 
from prior performance and attention to monitoring. 
No relationship was found when performance was 
measured by ROA. However, in the ROE model, we 
see that duality amplifies the negative relationship. In 
total, these two results suggest that CEO-chairs may 
use their power less frequently when performance is 
increasing. In both cases, however, as seen in Figures 
3 and 4, there is a strong effect on the intercept of the 
boards’ attention to monitoring. 
Duality’s direct and interactive effects suggest it is 
an important antecedent to effective board function. 
In fact, combining duality with positive performance 
deviation may lead to unacceptably low levels of 
board attention to monitoring, which may undermine 
the protection of shareholders’ interests. On the other 
hand, the high levels of board attention to monitoring 
in firms without duality and facing performance de-
clines might yield “too much” oversight; CEOs might 
feel unsupported (e.g., constantly questioned) and 
thus delay taking necessary, yet risky, actions. 
Finally, after we found support for our duality-
attention to monitoring hypothesis (Hypothesis 3), 
we conducted several post hoc analyses to investi-
gate the ways in which duality may affect boards’ 
attention to monitoring. Specifically, we posited 
that a chairperson can have substantial influence 
over the agenda of board meetings (Finkelstein 
and D’Aveni, 1994), a factor Ocasio (1997) suggests 
will affect committee members’ allocation of atten-
tion. By designing and implementing more detailed, 
rigid agendas, CEO-chairs can focus the attention 
of boards on topics that suit their own interests and 
away from monitoring issues. Our test supports this 
relationship. Specifically, in a duality-only subsam-
ple, a model including all control variables along 
with a categorical variable operationalizing agenda 
detail, we found that agenda detail was significantly 
and negatively related to board discussions of mon-
itoring issues. This aids our understanding of one 
important way duality may affect boards’ attention 
to monitoring. 
Next, we thought that holding board meetings in 
venues other than the corporate boardroom might 
limit board attention to monitoring for two reasons. 
First, research shows that variety in environmental 
stimuli consume individuals’ limited attentional ca-
pacity (Russell and Ward, 1982). Second, by conven-
ing meetings in off-site locations, which are often at 
least semi-recreational in nature, CEO-chairs may in-
gratiate themselves to corporate board members, cre-
ating norms of reciprocity (Gouldner, 1960) that favor 
support of the CEO-chair (Westphal and Stern, 2007a, 
2007b). Our tests suggest that CEO-chairs may use 
off-site meetings to limit boards’ attention to mon-
itoring. Using models similar to those used to ex-
amine the effects of agenda setting, we find that the 
percentage of annual offsite board meeting time is 
significantly and negatively related to the amount of 
board meeting discussion allocated to monitoring is-
sues. This gives us a glimpse of yet another avenue 
through which CEO duality may affect boards’ atten-
tion to monitoring.  
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Limitations and future research 
This study contributes to a growing body of re-
search (e.g., Westphal and Khanna, 2003; Westphal 
and Zajac, 1997) that sheds light into the “black box” 
of board functioning; however it would be useful for 
future work to supplement board transcripts with 
other sources of data related to director behavior. For 
example, supplementing board transcript data with 
discussions occurring in separate committee meetings 
or even outside of the boardroom proper would con-
tribute additional understanding of board monitoring 
behavior. It may be, however, that some monitoring 
behavior is purely cognitive, with no record available. 
Second, not being able to quantify social relationships 
among the board members limits these data. Third, 
the focus on U.S. firms in our sample may represent 
another potential limitation; future research may fur-
ther contribute to our understanding of board mon-
itoring by conducting similar studies with a more 
globalized sample. Fourth, while we measured the 
quantity of board attention to monitoring, the qual-
ity of board attention to monitoring was not assessed. 
Though board attention to monitoring is necessary for 
effective board governance, it is not sufficient. Finally, 
while the diverse industries examined allow for gen-
eralization of our findings, this generalizability may 
not extend to small firms. Few small firms had board 
transcripts detailed enough for analysis. 
Conclusion 
What factors influence boards of directors’ alloca-
tion of attention to monitoring is an important ques-
tion facing corporate governance researchers and 
practitioners, particularly in today’s economic envi-
ronment. Our analysis of actual transcripts of hun-
dreds of board meetings demonstrates that board 
members selectively attend to monitoring depend-
ing on the firms’ deviation from prior performance 
and whether duality is present. Our findings may as-
sist stakeholders in devising mechanisms that ensure 
shareholder interests are upheld more consistently. 
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Appendix A: Obtaining Board Transcripts 
Sample 
In collecting board transcript data for this study, 
we implemented the following three design proce-
dures: (1) we ensured firm and director confidenti-
ality and risk-free participation, (2) we elicited par-
ticipation of sample firms’ respective auditing firms, 
and (3) we organized auditing firms’ certified profes-
sional accountants (CPAs) as coders. A more detailed 
description of these procedures is outlined in the fol-
lowing sections. 
Firm participation in sample 
First, we contacted 1,894 firms to request their par-
ticipation in a research program focusing on board 
of director discussions. In many cases, firm records 
managers (often attorneys) expressed reluctance to 
allow their board meeting transcripts outside their 
firm. To overcome this problem, we requested that 
the firm’s auditors, who already have read and cur-
rently have access to board transcripts as part of the 
firm’s required annual audit, code the firm’s board 
transcripts regarding the discussion of monitoring 
behaviors. Auditors are bound by the American In-
stitute of Certified Public Accountants’ Code of Pro-
fessional Conduct, of which rule 301 states that ‘[a] 
member in public practice shall not disclose any con-
fidential client information without the specific con-
sent of the client’ (AICPA, 1988: ET Section 301.01). 
To further assure participating sample firms of the 
risk-free nature of their participation, confidential-
ity agreements were offered to each firm specifying 
firm and director anonymity. Also, the time sensitiv-
ity of board discussions was considered. Though the 
initial data-gathering phase of this research was con-
ducted in late 2003, the sample coding was stopped 
at fiscal yearend 2000. Twenty-one percent, or 398, of 
the firms contacted agreed to participate in this study 
and had board transcripts of sufficient quality to un-
dergo coding. Of the 398 firms that agreed to partic-
ipate, only 210 had board meeting transcripts with 
sufficient detail for the purposes of this study.9 Addi-
tionally, 32 firms from this 210 were eliminated from 
our ultimate sample of 178 firms due to an error in 
CPA coding for this project.  
Auditing firm participation 
CPAs of the public accounting firms that per-
formed the audits of our sample firms during our 
sample period were utilized as coders. We requested 
each auditing firm’s participation in this study once a 
sample firm agreed to participate. 
The sample firms’ auditors have unique access to 
company board transcripts, which makes them an 
appealing conduit to board transcript coding. Au-
diting firms deliver an opinion on a company’s fi-
nancial statements based on their audit of the firm’s 
current accounting cycle (typically one year). In do-
ing so, the auditors compile supporting documents at 
each stage of the annual audit. These documents are 
referred to as ‘current workpapers’ and are retained 
in a ‘current’ file by the auditors. If documents apply 
to a company’s longer-term (typically more than one 
year) concerns, then these documents are retained in 
a file referred to as a ‘permanent file.’ Examples of 
current file documents are as follows: verification of 
a random sample of current-year sales receipts, verifi-
cation of separation of controls, and review of invest-
ments made in the last year over a material amount. 
Examples of permanent file documents include the 
following: organizational structure of the firm, cop-
ies of important legal documents, copies of long-term 
loans, and board transcripts. 
While not all auditing firms follow the same au-
diting procedures and retention policies, board tran-
scripts are, by auditing convention, retained in the 
auditor’s permanent file. Thus, for our sample firms, 
board transcripts were available for years 1994–2000 
unless the firm discontinued operation. Also contrib-
uting to this study’s time period selection was the au-
ditors’ implementation of retaining copies of board 
transcripts electronically. Because electronic versions 
of files are less expensive to retain than hard copies, 
auditors typically have word processing copies of 
these files from 1994 onward. 
Also, we were able to accommodate the busy 
schedules of the auditing firms. The reviewing and 
9. We tested for director-level and firm-level characteristic differences between participating firms that had detailed enough min-
utes to be included in this study’s sample and firms that did not. Using the Kolmogorov-Smirnov test, no significant differences 
were found.   
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coding of board transcripts by CPAs was coordinated 
to accommodate the auditors’ schedules. The major-
ity of this study’s coding took place in the months of 
November and December 2003, which is typically a 
time period when auditing firms experience a lull in 
their business. 
Organization of CPAs 
Assignment of CPA coders and the coding proce-
dures are explained in Appendix B. Coordination of 
the auditing firm coding and payment of the audit 
firms for their services are detailed in this subsection. 
The 178 sample companies (979 company-years) au-
dits were performed by one of, or a combination of, 
six national auditing firms and two regional audit-
ing firms for this study’s time frame. Combinations 
of auditing firms occurred when the sample company 
changed auditing firms by preference or by necessity. 
Over the sample and data collection periods, two ma-
jor changes occurred within the U.S. accounting in-
dustry. In 1998, Price Waterhouse and Coopers & 
Lybrand accounting firms merged into Price Water-
house Coopers. Also, in August 2002, Arthur Ander-
son agreed to surrender its CPA licenses and its right 
to practice before the Securities and Exchange Com-
mission. In both of these instances, board transcripts 
for our sample companies were transferred to the 
new auditors as part of the overall audit materials. 
As detailed in Appendix B, various amounts of 
coding time were necessary for each set of annual 
board minutes. Payment varied depending on the 
time spent and the price agreed upon with each au-
diting firm. These prices were negotiated at the audit-
ing office level, not the national level. Of the 178 sam-
ple firms, 58 firms (278 firm-years) were coded at the 
full or reduced billable rate of their respective audi-
tors, 82 firms (441 firm-years) were coded at the esti-
mated cost of their respective auditors, and 38 firms 
(260 firm-years) were coded for free by their firms’ 
respective auditors. Many of the auditors agreed to 
charge a reduced price or forego payment for the 
coding if the timing of the coding was flexible be-
cause many of the managers of the coders suggested 
that assigning staff accountants the task of familiariz-
ing themselves with the board minutes of clients was 
a helpful exercise for future audits. Other auditing 
firm managers cited professional reciprocity as the 
reason for reducing or waiving their billable rates for 
services rendered for this study. 
Appendix B: Content Analysis Protocols for 
Scientific Robustness 
The following protocols were taken to strengthen the 
reliability of board transcript coding: 
1. Sentence by sentence evaluation 
Board meeting agendas structure meeting com-
munication into specific discussion topics. Uti-
lizing this relatively high degree of communi-
cative formality, coders were directed to first 
review the board meeting agenda for the respec-
tive meeting transcripts they were preparing to 
code. When the board meeting agenda specifi-
cally allocated discussion time for monitoring re-
lated topics, coders were instructed to highlight 
the beginning and end of the associated discus-
sion in the board meeting transcripts. This pro-
cedure was done to help focus the coders’ time 
and attention during the coding process. For the 
purposes of this study,10 and as an initial step to 
strengthen coding reliability, each coder was then 
instructed to read each sentence in the board min-
utes separately and ask him or herself the follow-
ing questions: 
•    Is this sentence representative of the board moni-
toring the firm’s management? (such as manage-
ment’s decisions or actions), or 
•  Is this sentence representative of the board at-
tempting to control the management of the firm? 
(such as controlling management through align-
ment of their interest with those of sharehold-
ers— e.g., compensation). 
After coding a firm’s complete set of fiscal year 
meeting minutes by sentence, each coder categorized 
and summed the time, measured in minutes, allo-
cated to monitoring. These codes were then sent to 
the researcher(s) for comparison between coders.  
10. Due to the unique (and possibly one-time) access to these firms’ board meeting transcripts and the start-up cost associated 
with securing and training coders, coders repeated the above steps for other discussion topics, such as competitive threats, cor-
porate social responsibility, and financial and strategic evaluation. 
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 2. Coding as a sequence 
As another procedure to strengthen reliability, 
the coding process was implemented as a set of 
sequential topic-specific phases (e.g., product and 
market opportunities; competitive threats; mon-
itoring; corporate social responsibility; etc. . .) to 
reduce coding complexity. Coding instructions 
were designed to reduce the coding task to a cler-
ical function (D’Aveni and Macmillan, 1990). 
These instructions, concept definitions, and ac-
companying ‘indicator’ word and phrase lists, in-
cluding synonyms, were sent to coders only af-
ter he or she had completed the previous coding 
phase. To ensure accurate measurement of board 
meeting discussion time allocation on each topic, 
at least two coders were assigned to every set of 
firm-year transcripts and three coders were as-
signed to transcripts that were less structured 
(did not have time documentation throughout 
the dictation transcripts). Coders in the same ac-
counting office were kept on separate phases to 
ensure independence in coding. 
3. Coding rules 
Following D’Aveni and MacMillan’s (1990) cod-
ing design, this study’s coders first followed the 
general coding rule of only coding explicit ref-
erences to board monitoring (using indicator 
words and phrases). Next, coders were to look 
for ‘references back’ or sentences with an im-
plicit (or supporting) reference to the indicator 
word or phrase. In contrast to D’Aveni and Mac-
Millan (1990), which measured attention by sen-
tence count, this study focuses on time allocation. 
Therefore, coders were instructed to demarcate 
sentences that supported the monitoring indica-
tor words and phrases (or the sentences in which 
they were contained). When the indicator words 
or phrases were used in a manner that was not 
the focus of the discussion or not referring to the 
firm as the primary actor, coders were instructed 
not to categorize these words and phrases as 
monitoring. Coding discussion is a complex task. 
We began the pretest stage with over 10 nuanced 
rules for coding board discussions of monitoring. 
However, during the pretest coding, we found 
that many of the rules were unnecessary and re-
sulted in coder confusion. However, when coders 
were instructed simply to focus on the indicator 
words and phrases and to determine if each sen-
tence followed the instructional questions above, 
coders were able to execute their task efficiently 
and effectively. It is important to note, consider-
ing the relatively formal structure of most board 
meetings, board discussions provide a relatively 
simple topic coding task as compared to less for-
mal discussions. As noted above in protocol one, 
the topics of board discussion are slated in the 
agenda prior to the meeting. Also contributing to 
the formality of board discussions are the ‘rules 
of order’ that are followed in most board meet-
ings. These rules keep the discussion on-topic 
and on-agenda. The strictness of rule enforce-
ment is often at a chairperson’s discretion. 
4. Coder training 
Because it was agreed upon that each of the com-
panies’ respective auditing firm’s employees were 
to serve as the coders of the transcripts, 271 cod-
ers at 56 various locations participated. To ensure 
reliability between coders and the validity of our 
procedure, two stages of pretests were conducted. 
The three firms, 21 firm-years, used for the pretests 
agreed to allow their board transcripts to be used 
as long as anonymity was assured. Each firm re-
viewed its respective transcripts after they were 
‘cleaned’ of any identifying information and be-
fore they were sent to potential coders. For the first 
pretest, board transcripts for 14 firm-years were 
electronically sent to each potential coder with all 
identifying names disguised. Coders were also 
sent instructions and participated in Web confer-
ence meetings with this study’s first author. The 
word and phrase list, the instructions, and the 
rules evolved as the pretests took place. Also, poor 
performing coders could be replaced. However, 
few coders needed replacement. 
5. Cross-coding transcripts 
For each company year, board meeting tran-
scripts were assigned to at least two coders. The 
same coders were assigned all years of a com-
pany’s transcripts. After all coders for a com-
pany had submitted their coding results to the 
researcher(s), one of the coders for the common 
set of transcripts was responsible for upload-
ing the transcripts to a secure computer and au-
tomated text analysis software, N6, to search the 
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electronic versions of the transcripts.11 This soft-
ware was programmed with the monitoring indi-
cator words or phrases. Then a copy of the tran-
scripts was downloaded by the coder with the 
indicator words and phrases highlighted. Each 
coder then compared his or her coding results 
to make sure no indicator item had been over-
looked. If an indicator was found to have been 
excluded by any of the coders, they reexamined 
the previously excluded item. 
These indicator words and phrases were used 
to draw coders’ attention to a certain section of 
the board transcripts. Coders then determined 
whether the word or phrase was used in a man-
ner relevant to our study. The amount of time 
the boards spent discussing monitoring issues 
was subsequently used to measure the attention 
boards dedicated to monitoring activities. The 
time spent discussing monitoring as a propor-
tion of total board meeting time was coded as the 
board’s allocation of attention to monitoring. 
Approximately two-thirds of the board tran-
scripts document the board meeting time in great 
detail (usually dictated transcripts with time 
spent systematically recorded). For non-dictated 
transcripts, coders examined the amount of text 
regarding monitoring relative the entire text of 
the meeting and estimated what proportion of the 
board meeting was devoted to discussing moni-
toring. Inherently subjective, coder estimation 
presents a limitation on the value of these tran-
scripts. To reduce this weakness, we put less de-
tailed transcripts through the regular process of 
dual coding and, additionally, had a third coder 
review them when we encountered differences 
between coders of more than 10 percent; other-
wise, the results were averaged. 
6. Negotiation of coders 
Coders were chosen by a contact partner in each 
auditing firm. For each sample company, a con-
tact partner identified at least three accountants 
at different levels of career seniority to participate 
in the study.12 Most commonly, coder one was a 
new staff accountant (one to two years of expe-
rience), coder two was a senior accountant (three 
to five years of experience), and coder three was 
a manager (five plus years of experience). Coders 
one and two coded each set of transcripts. Cod-
ers were instructed to print out hard copies of the 
transcripts they coded and make notes on these 
files so they could recall and defend their cod-
ing results of this topic. Additionally, coders re-
corded the number of time each indicator word or 
phrase appeared in an annual set of transcripts, 
how many sentences focused on this topic, the 
total amount of time the board spent discussing 
this topic, and the percentage of the meeting de-
voted to monitoring. After each coder had coded 
his or her transcripts for a certain topic, he or she 
submitted the coded results to the researcher(s). 
Once both coders had submitted their coding re-
sults, the reliability between the coders was as-
sessed by the researcher(s). If a certain threshold 
of agreement was achieved, 90 percent (deter-
mined by the researcher(s)), they were instructed 
to resolve any differences in coding. If differences 
were greater than 10 percent, the third coder was 
sent the instructions and indicator word and 
phrase list and instructed to code the specific 
firm-year transcripts with the conflict. After the 
third coder submitted his or her coding results, 
agreement between all three coders was assessed 
and coders were instructed to resolve differences 
in a post-negotiation meeting. 
The carefully detailed coding instructions and 
protocols developed for this study were intended 
to minimize subjective judgments in the content re-
cording process. While the coding results of any sin-
gle coder are inherently subjectively derived within 
the confines of the coding rules and protocols, high 
intersubjective agreement between coders lends 
credence to the coding process and, therefore, the 
results.
11. In an effort to assure security of the documents, transcripts were promptly deleted after N6 was executed. 
12. Some auditing firm offices had many sample firms to code and, therefore, assigned different teams of accountants to code dif-
ferent sample firms.  
